As Justice Harlan explained, where a State lacked the power to proscribe the habeas petitioner’s conduct, “it could not constitutionally insist that he remain in jail.” Desist, supra, at 261, n. 2 (dissenting opinion). But that Clause does not specify the scope of the writ. This was an appeal by the father from the dismissal of his application for a reduction or elimination of spousal and child support. See Siebold, 100 U. S., at 376. Rather, it endorses the exception as expanded by Penry, to include “rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense.” 492 U. S., at 330. That Miller did not impose a formal factfinding requirement does not leave States free to sentence a child whose crime reflects transient immaturity to life without parole. Compare Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 654–660 (1961) (courts on direct review must exclude evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment), with Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 489–496 (1976) (no relitigation of such claims on collateral review). 163, 175–176 (1874). Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U. S. 361 (1989). An illegal sentence “is primarily restricted to those instances in which the term of the prisoner’s sentence is not authorized by the statute or statutes which govern the penalty” for the crime of conviction. I respectfully dissent. What silliness.  Nor am I aware of any other provision in the Constitution that would support the Court’s new constitutional right to retroactivity. He was convicted, and the verdict resulted in an automatic life-without-parole sentence.  The other sleight of hand performed by the majority is its emphasis on Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371 (1880). Art. 3d 264. And again five years ago this Court left in place this severe sanction for juvenile homicide offenders. before imposing a particular penalty.” 567 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 20). Ante, at 8. It held that “a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final.” Id., at 328. What the majority expects (and intends) to happen is set forth in the following not-so-subtle invitation: “A State may remedy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them.” Ante, at 21.  This is another case in a series of decisions involving the sentencing of offenders who were juveniles when their crimes were committed. It follows that a court has no authority to leave in place a conviction or sentence that violates a substantive rule, regardless of whether the conviction or sentence became final before the rule was announced. To ensure this conclusion is correct, the Court appointed Richard D. Bernstein as amicus curiaeto brief and argue the position that the Court lacks jurisdiction. Montgomery then filed an application for a supervisory writ. Miller did bar life without parole, however, for all but the rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility. The Fourth Circuit accordingly remanded Malvo’s case to the District Court to consider Montgomery ’s … See Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States 1776–1865, 32 U. Chi.  I doubt that today’s rule will fare any better. Cornell Montgomery is listed as a Member/Manager with Ct Investigations LLC in Louisiana. The “evolving standards” test concedes that in 1969 the State had the power to punish Henry Montgomery as it did. Under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, state collateral review courts have no greater power than federal habeas courts to mandate that a prisoner continue to suffer punishment barred by the  Constitution. Unlike procedural rules, which govern the manner in which a defendant could be found guilty for their illegal conduct, substantive rules are Id. Ante, at 9. V and XIV, §1. Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy explained that Miller is retroactive because it announced a substantive rule of constitutional law. E.g., Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 6/20/14), 141 So. 3d 264, reversed and remanded. The conclusion that Miller states a substantive rule comports with the principles that informed Teague. For that reason, Miller is no less substantive than are Roper and Graham.” Ante, at 17–18. That case considered a petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus following a federal conviction, and the initial issue it confronted was its jurisdiction. Id., at 572. We have never understood due process to require further proceedings once a trial ends.  By holding that new substantive rules are, indeed, retroactive, Teague continued a long tradition of giving retroactive effect to constitutional rights that go beyond procedural guarantees.  “[O]ur jurisprudence concerning the ‘retroactivity’ of ‘new rules’ of constitutional law is primarily concerned, not with the question whether a constitutional violation occurred, but with the availability or nonavailability of remedies.” Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U. S. 264, 290–291 (2008).  Teague’s central purpose was to do away with the old regime’s tendency to “continually force the States to marshal resources in order to keep in prison defendants whose trials and appeals conformed to then-existing constitutional standards.” 489 U. S., at 310. 567 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 1). States may not disregard a controlling, constitutional command in their own courts. See Brief for Petitioner, Henry Montgomery at 3.  In addition, amicus directs us to Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U. S. 264 (2008), in which a majority of the Court held that Teague does not preclude state courts from giving retroactive effect to a broader set of new constitutional rules than Teague itself required. See 567 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 20). But, as Justice Harlan had explained, that view of Article III has no force on collateral review: “While the entire theoretical underpinnings of judicial review and constitutional supremacy dictate that federal courts having jurisdiction on direct review adjudicate every issue of law . . . Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 U. S. 152, 165–166 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (“Since a State could . . . Those procedural requirements do not, of course, transform substantive rules into procedural ones. 3d 1044, 1047; see also State v. Alexander, 2014–0401 (La. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied the application.  If, however, the Constitution establishes a rule and requires that the rule have retroactive application, then a state court’s refusal to give the rule retroactive effect is reviewable by this Court.  This backward-looking language requires an examination of the state-court decision at the time it was made.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U. S. 170, 181–182 (2011). Since the Griffith rule is constitution ally compelled, we instructed the lower state and federal courts to comply with it as well. Siebold did not imply that the Constitution requires courts to stop enforcing convictions under an unconstitutional law. We have jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. §1257 only if the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision implicates a federal right. (And how impossible in practice, see Brief for National District Attorneys Assn. Under this standard, and for the reasons explained below, Miller announced a substantive rule that is retroactive in cases on collateral review. The Danforth majority limited its analysis to Teague’s general  retroactivity bar, leaving open the question whether Teague’s two exceptions are binding on the States as a matter of constitutional law. (quoting Graham, supra, at 71; internal quotation marks omitted).  Louisiana suggests that Miller cannot have made a constitutional distinction between children whose crimes reflect transient immaturity and those whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption because Miller did not require trial courts to make a finding of fact regarding a child’s incorrigibility. La. subject its trial-court determinations to no review whatever, it could a fortiori subject them to review which consists of a nonadversarial reexamination of convictions by a panel of government experts”). Because Miller determined that sentencing a child to life without parole is excessive for all but “ ‘the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption,’ ” id., at ___, it rendered life without parole an unconstitutional penalty for “a class of defendants because of their status”—i.e., juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of youth, Penry, 492 U. S., at 330. The majority opines that because a substantive rule eliminates a State’s power to proscribe certain conduct or impose a certain punishment, it has “the automatic consequence of invalidating a defendant’s conviction or sentence.” Ante, at 9. Following his analysis, we have clarified time and again—recently in Greene v. Fisher, 565 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2011) (slip op., at 4–5)—that federal habeas courts are to review state-court decisions against the law and factual record that existed at the time the decisions were made.  It is undisputed, then, that Teague requires the retroactive application of new substantive and watershed procedural rules in federal habeas proceedings. A State may remedy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them. Pp. 14–21. Id., at 323. for Cert. 1–4 (La. Ante, at 12–13. 4 Cir.  The Supremacy Clause does not do so. The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that none of those grounds provides a basis for collateral review of sentencing errors.  It is simply wrong to divorce that dictum from the facts it addressed. 882, 926 (West 2008). Relying on Roper v. Simmons, 543 U. S. 551, and Graham v. Florida, 560 U. S. 48, Miller recognized that children differ from adults in their “diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform,” 567 U. S., at ___, and that these distinctions “diminish the penological justifications” for imposing life without parole on juvenile offenders, id., at ___.  I join Justice Scalia’s dissent. S. Kyle Duncan for the respondent Facts of the case In 1963, Henry Montgomery was found guilty and received the death penalty for the murder of Charles Hunt, which Montgomery committed less than two weeks after he turned 17. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U. S. 399, 416–417 (1986) (“[W]e leave to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences”). The parties divorced in 1997 and agreed that they would have joint custody of their children. Instead, it mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics—before imposing a particular penalty.” Miller, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 20). But a majority of this Court, eager to reach the merits of this case, resolves the question of our jurisdiction by deciding that the Constitution requires state postconviction courts to adopt Teague’s exception for  so-called “substantive” new rules and to provide state-law remedies for the violations of those rules to prisoners whose sentences long ago became final. 1966). As Teague, supra, at 292, 312, and Penry, supra, at 330, indicate, substantive rules set forth categorical constitutional guarantees that place certain criminal laws and punishments altogether beyond the State’s power to impose. Under Louisiana law, this verdict required the trial court to impose a sentence of life without parole.  1. This Court has jurisdiction to decide whether the Louisiana Supreme Court correctly refused to give retroactive effect to Miller. I write separately to explain why the Court’s resolution of the jurisdictional question, ante, at 5–14, lacks any foundation in the Constitution’s text or our historical traditions. For that reason, Miller is no less substan tive than are Roper and Graham. And then, in Godfather fashion, the majority makes state legislatures an offer they can’t refuse: Avoid all the utterly impossible nonsense we have prescribed by simply “permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole.” Ante, at 21. under the Eighth Amendment.” See ante, at 13.  Unlike the rule the Court announces today, this limitation at least reflects a constitutional principle. Per haps it can be established that, due to exceptional circumstances, this fate was a just and proportionate punishment for the crime he committed as a 17-year-old boy. 882. See Bator, supra, at 473–474, and n. 77. It only elicits another question: What federal law is supreme? But to say that a punishment might be inappropriate and disproportionate for certain juvenile offenders is not to say that it is unconstitutionally void. et al. I, §9, cl. Even if a court considers a child’s age before sentencing him or her  to a lifetime in prison, that sentence still violates the Eighth Amendment for a child whose crime reflects “ ‘unfortunate yet transient immaturity.’ ” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 17) (quoting Roper, 543 U. S., at 573). Miller, it is true, did not bar a punishment for all juvenile offenders, as the Court did in Roper or Graham. Statement of the Facts: In 1963, 17-year-old Montgomery killed a deputy sheriff in Louisiana. Amicus argues that a State is under no obligation to give a new rule of constitutional law retroactive effect in its own collateral review proceedings. Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., 575 U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (slip op., at 3). However, neither Teague nor Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U. S. 264—which concerned only Teague’s general retroactivity bar for new constitutional rules of criminal procedure—had occasion to address whether States are required as a constitutional matter to give retroactive effect to new substantive rules. right to enforce federal laws against the States.” Armstrong, 575 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 4). No problem. The jury returned a verdict of “guilty without capital punishment.” State v. Montgomery, 242 So. 2d 818 (La. In that context, Yates merely reinforces the line drawn by Griffith: when state courts provide a forum for postconviction relief, they need to play by the “old rules” announced before the date on which a defendant’s conviction and sentence became final. 441, 466 (1963). When a new substantive rule of constitutional law is established, this Court is careful to limit the scope of any attendant procedural requirement to avoid intruding more than necessary upon the States’ sovereign administration of their criminal justice systems. Justice Harlan called upon the Court to engage in “informed and deliberate consideration” of “whether the States are constitutionally required to apply [Gideon’s] new rule retrospectively, which may well require the reopening of cases long since finally adjudicated in accordance with then applicable decisions of this Court.” Pickelsimer, supra, at 3. , 2011–1756, pp scope of the Supremacy Clause conceivably command a state from “de ny [ ing ] any! 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